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TORT LAW-A Cause of Action for Negligent Horseplay:
Yount v. Johnson
I. INTRODUCTION
In Yount v. Johnson,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of
public policy, minors engaged in horseplay owed each other "the same duty of
reasonable care for one another's safety as that which is ordinarily expected
elsewhere measured by minors of similar 'age, mental competency, and
experience." 2 Additionally, the court held that neither primary implied assumption
of risk nor consent may bar a claim of negligent horseplay.3 In so holding, the court
departed from New Mexico precedent which sets a higher threshold for tort liability,
requiring sports participants to engage in reckless or intentional conduct before
liability will be imposed. The Yount decision also deviates from traditional tort
doctrine with regard to the defenses of consent and primary assumption of risk.
To put Yount in context, Part II of this Note summarizes the alternate theories of
recovery available to a participant injured while engaging in sports and recreation.
Part II additionally provides an overview of assumption of risk doctrine and the law
of consent as applied in New Mexico before Yount. Part III examines the facts and
the holding of Yount. Part I then presents the majority's reasoning and discusses the
concerns expressed in Judge Hartz's dissenting opinion. Part IV interprets and
analyzes Yount's ramifications.
II.

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Alternative Theories of Recovery
In Yount v. Johnson,4 the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered the proper
legal standard to be applied to determine participant liability for injuries arising out
of horseplay. The following section briefly analyzes the three approaches for
determining participant liability for injuries arising from sports and
recreation-namely, negligence, recklessness, and the intentional tort of battery.'
This discussion provides a context for analyzing Yount.
A.

1. 121 N.M. 585, 915 P.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1996).
2. Id. at 591, 915 P.2d at 347 (quoting N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1605).
3. See id. Primary assumption of risk, as a concept of negligence, has survived New Mexico's adoption of
contributory negligence and comparative fault.
Williamson [v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971),] does not answer the question of
whether assumption of the risk is still viable [in New Mexico] as it relates to duty and breach of
duty .... That case indicates that assumption of the risk, in its primary sense, is still the law. It
was only assumption of the risk, in the secondary sense, as a defense separate and apart from
contributory negligence that was abolished.
Diaz v. McMahon, 112 N.M. 788, 790 n.2, 819 P.2d 1346, 1348 n.2 (Ct. App. 1991); see Thompson v. RuidosoSunland, Inc., 105 N.M. 487, 734 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1987); Moreno v. Mars, 102 N.M. 373, 695 P.2d 1322 (Ct.
App. 1984); see also Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
4. 121 N.M. 585, 915 P.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1996).
5. See Kabella v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461, 462, 672 P.2d 290, 291 (Ct. App. 1983) (jurisdictions have
"permitted recovery in tort for sports injuries predicated on three divergent legal theories: (1) assault and battery; (2)
negligence; and (3) wilfull or reckless misconduct.")
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1. Negligence
Negligence is "conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing
damage." It is failure to use the degree of care which a reasonable person would use
under similar circumstances. 7 The substantive test of negligence requires that there
be a duty of care, breach of that duty,8 causation,9 and damages.1 ° Only a minority of
jurisdictions apply a negligence standard in sports participant liability cases. 1
Preference for this standard turns on the fact that it is considered "straightforward"
and flexible enough to be fairly applied to individual cases and varied
circumstances.' 2 Additionally, "tort law condemns unreasonably dangerous behavior
and . . . the playing 13field should not provide license to engage in unreasonably
dangerous behavior.,

2. Recklessness
The majority of jurisdictions has adopted a recklessness standard as the level of
care which is owed among participants in sports whether professional or amateur,
formal or informal, or traditional or non-traditional.' 4 Thus, in these jurisdictions, an
allegation of negligence is insufficient to establish an actionable claim.
Reckless misconduct differs from negligence, in that the latter consists of mere
inadvertence, lack of skillfulness or failure to take precautions, while reckless

6. Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1915); see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 31, at 169 (5th ed. 1984).
7. See Bober v. New Mexico State Fair, 111 N.M. 644, 650, 808 P.2d 614,620 (1991); see also KEETON
ETAL., supra note 6, §§ 31, 32, at 169-73, 173-79.
8. See Barham v. Baca, 80 N.M. 502, 503, 458 P.2d 228, 229 (1969); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note
6, § 30, at 164-65.
9. See generally Armstrong v. Industrial Electric and Equip. Serv., 97 N.M. 272, 274, 639 P.2d 81, 83 (Ct.
App. 1981) (stating that the plaintiff has the burden to prove that negligent acts were the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injury); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 30, at 164-65.
10. See generally Armstrong, 97 N.M. at 274, 639 P.2d at 83 (stating that the plaintiff must prove that she
has sustained damage); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 30-56, at 160-385.
11. See, e.g., Gray v. Houlton, 671 P.2d 443 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (skiing); Babych v. McRae, 567 A.2d 1269
(Conn. 1989) (hockey); Duke's GMC, Inc. v. Erskine, 447 N.E.2d 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (golf); Auckenthaer
v. Grundmeyer, 877 P.2d 1039 (Nev. 1994) (horse rider kicked by another's horse); Crawn v. Campo, 630 A.2d 368
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (softball); Lestina v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28 (Wis. 1993) (soccer).
12. See Auckenthaler, 877 P.2d at 1043.
[Tihe jury simply examines each case to determine whether the defendant acted unreasonably
under the circumstances. Within the factual climate of recreational activities, or even sporting
events, the question posed is whether the defendant participated in a reasonable manner and
within the rules of the game or in accordance with the ordinary scope of the activity.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Lestina, 501 N.W.2d at 33 (In determining liability, the factfinder should consider
the nature of the sport involved; the roles of the game; any customs and usages; the type and level of physical contact
involved; the foreseeable and non-foreseeable risks; and the unique circumstances of the case before it such as the
age of participants, the level of the participants' skill, and the availability of safety gear.).
13. Lestina, 501 N.W.2d at 31-32.
14. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992) (touch football); Pfister v. Shusta, 627 N.E.2d 1260
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (kick the can); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (111.App. Ct. 1975) (soccer); Picou v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (softball); Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989)
(hockey); Moe v. Steenberg, 147 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1966) (ice skating); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.w.2d 11 (Mo. 1982)
(softball); Dotzler v. Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990) (pickup basketball); Kabela v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461,
672 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1983) (informal tackle football); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986) (professional
horseracing); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990) (kick the can); Connell v. Payne, 814 S.W.2d 486
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (polo); Heliriegel v. Tholl, 417 P.2d 362 (Wash. 1966) (horseplay).
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misconduct involves a choice or adoption of a course of action either with
knowledge of the danger or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this
danger to a reasonable man. 5

The risk is generally "'substantially greater in magnitude than is necessary in the case
of negligence.'"' 6
In limiting recovery to those cases where a player has demonstrated reckless
disregard, courts often explain that sports players assume the risk of injuries which
are inherent in or incidental to the game when they voluntarily participate in sports
activities. Rather than look at the particular circumstances of a given case, these
jurisdictions presume assumption of risk as a matter of law so that actionable
negligence is never present. 7 Courts also state public policy reasons for barring
recovery--"active participation in sporting events should not be chilled by the threat
of litigation."' 8 A recklessness standard is considered a good balance between
encouraging vigorous participation while also promoting discipline among athletes
and providing a means of redress for injured parties. 19 In 1983, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals adopted the recklessness standard as being the appropriate one for
injuries arising out of contact sports, primarily for policy reasons and only
incidentally because of assumption of risk.'
3.

Intentional Tort

The intentional tort of battery is the wrongful touching of another's body. 2' A
wrongful touching is one which is "harmful or offensive," unpermitted, and
intentional.22 The intention need not be hostile, nor need the intention be to inflict
actual damage.' The defendant may be liable even if he intends only a practical

15. Kabella, 100 N.M. at 464, 672 P.2d at 293 (citing Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516
(10th Cir. 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1966))).
16. Id. (quoting Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 524).
17. See, e.g., Kuehner v. Green, 436 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1983); Richmond v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 298 So.
2d 118 (La. Ct. App. 1974). The scope of assumption of risk varies in jurisdictions. Some courts hold that risks
inherent in the sport are those which, while not violating safety rules, result in injury. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 50 cmt. b (1965). Other courts hold that risk of injury is to foreseeable conduct only, irrespective of the
rules. See, e.g., Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So.2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1976); cf.Hackbart,601 F.2d at 520 ("It is highly
questionable whether a professional football player consents or submits to injuries caused by conduct not within the
rules."). Courts have found it difficult to draw these lines; much debate surrounds the scope of implied consent in
sports litigation and the justifications for line drawing. However that discussion is outside the scope of this note.
18. Kabella, 100 N.M. at 465,672 P.2d at 294; see Hackbart,601 F.2d 516; Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d
App. Ct. 1975).
258 (Ill.
19. See Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 260. The Nabozny court explained:
[Tihe law should not place unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports
by our youth. However.... organized, athletic competition does not exist in a vacuum. Rather,
some of the restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete onto the playing field. One of
the educational benefits of organized athletic competition to our youth is the development of
discipline and self control.
Id.
20. See Kabella, 100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d 290.
21. See generally Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (1978).
22. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 9, at 39; see also Kabella, 100 N.M. at 462, 672 P.2d at 291, and
cases cited therein.
23. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 9,at 41-42 (liability may result even when the defendant
intends "only a joke, or even a compliment, as when an unappreciated kiss is bestowed without consent, or a
misguided effort is made to render assistance.").
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joke2' or good natured horseplay. The actor's liability for any resulting harm extends
to consequences which were unintended and which the defendant could not
reasonably have foreseen.' However, consent acts as a bar to a battery claim whether
the resulting injury was foreseeable or not.26
B.

Bars to Recovery

1. Assumption of Risk
Because the court in Yount v. Johnson discussed primary assumption of risk, an
overview of the doctrine prior to this case follows.
a. Express Assumption of Risk
Generally, when parties make express agreements to assume the risk of what
would ordinarily be a breach of duty, such agreement will be upheld and prevent a
cause of action in either negligence or recklessness or both.' Some express
agreements, however, are held invalid as against public policy. 29 For instance, where
there is disparity between the bargaining position of the parties, it is generally
considered socially undesirable to uphold an express agreement to assume certain
risks.3' Additionally, where the gravity of the risk is disproportionately greater than
the utility of creating it, an express assumption of the risk may be invalid.3'
b. Implied Assumption of Risk
In the absence of an express agreement, the nature of a given voluntary
relationship3 2 or conduct under a set of circumstances may give rise to an implied

24. See id.
25. See id. § 9, at 40.
26. See Kabella, 100 N.M. at 462-63, 672 P.2d at 291-92 (citing Hellriegel v. Tholl, 417 P.2d 362 (Wash.
1966)) (plaintiff who suffered broken neck during roughhouse horseplay was barred from recovery because of his
consent); McAdams v. Windham, 94 So. 742 (Ala. 1922) (denying recovery for fatal injuries sustained during a
consensual boxing match).
27. See Yount v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 585, 590-91, 915 P.2d 341, 346-47 (Ct. App. 1996).
28. See Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (1. 1995); see also Thompson v. Ruidoso-Sunland, Inc.,
105 N.M. 487, 492, 734 P.2d 267, 272 (Ct. App. 1987). An authority on tort law has described the doctrine of
assumption of the risk as follows:
In its most basic sense, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff, in advance, has given his
express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his
chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone. The
situation is then the same as where the plaintiff consents to the infliction of what would otherwise
be an intentional tort, except that the consent is to run the risk of unintended injury .... The result
is that the defendant is relieved of a legal duty to the plaintiff; and being under no duty, he cannot
be charged with negligence.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 68, at 480-81.
29. See 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF ToRTs, § 21.6, at 247-48 (2nd ed. 1986).
30. See id. § 26, at 247-50.
31. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, § 21.6, at 248.
32. See id. § 68, at 484. Every voluntary encounter with a given risk does not amount to an assumption of that
risk. Where there is an independent basis for finding a duty, such as a statutory or common law duty, then primary
assumption of risk does not apply and the defendant is not relieved of his duty. See Thompson v. Ruidoso-Sunland,
Inc., 105 N.M. 487, 491,734 P.2d 267, 271 (Ct. App. 1987) (primary assumption of risk did not bar claim where
defendant had a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to plaintiff arising from a landowner's common law
duty to a business invitee, N.M. UNiF. JURY INSTRUCION CIV. 13.10 (Repl. Pamp 1980), and New Mexico Racing
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assumption of risk.33 Implied assumption of risk "represents... a limitation of the
duty owed by one party toward another with respect to the risks incident to that
association ....[V]ery often the parties enter into such a relationship when one (or
both) of them does not have these risks or duties in mind at all."3' A plaintiff need not
necessarily have knowledge and full appreciation of a risk to assume it."
In Williamson v. Smith,36 the New Mexico Supreme Court explained that implied
assumption of risk consists of two concepts: primary and secondary assumption of
risk. The court stated that in its primary sense, assumption of risk was the counterpart
of defendant's lack of duty or absence of breach of duty.37 Essentially, "it is an
alternate expression for the proposition that the defendant was not negligent," 38
thereby denying the existence of any underlying cause of action.39
In its secondary sense, the Williamson court noted, assumption of risk was "'an
affirmative defense to an established breach of duty."' In other words, secondary
assumption of risk acted as a bar to recovery when a plaintiff deliberately chose to
encounter a risk created by a defendant's negligence. In situations where a plaintiff
acted unreasonably in encountering a given risk, the defense of assumption of risk
in its secondary sense was identical to the concept of contributory negligence.4"
Having defined and categorized the doctrine in this way, the Williamson court
merged primary implied assumption of risk into the law of negligence.42 Secondary

Commission regulations).
33. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 6, § 68, at 484.
34. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, § 21.6, at 246.
35. While knowledge or comprehension of the risk is sometimes the "watchword" of assumption of risk, it
is not a necessary factor in all cases.
There may be assumption ... of a specific risk of which the plaintiff is completely ignorant ....
[Conversely] the plaintiff does not assume, in the primary sense, many risks that he knows and
fully appreciates ....It is only where (1) defendant knows of the danger, or (2) is under a duty
to plaintiff to use care to discover the danger, but (in either event) will fully discharge his duty to
plaintiff by complete disclosure of the danger, that plaintiff's knowledge and comprehension [is
absolutely necessary to establish] ... assumption of the risk in the primary sense.
Id. § 21.2, at 210; cf.Moreno v. Marrs, 102 N.M. 373, 376, 695 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Ct. App. 1984) (As a matter of
policy, a fireman assumes only those hazards which are known or can reasonably be anticipated at the site of the fire.).
36. 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971). The Williamson court adopted the reasoning ofMeistrich v. Casino
Area Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959) and HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, § 21.31, at 1162.
37. See Williamson, 83 N.M. at 340,491 P.2d at 1151.
38. Id. Primary assumption of risk
refers to risks that are incidental to a relationship of free association between plaintiff and
defendant, that is to say, one that either is at liberty to take or leave as he will .... If these risks
are fully comprehended, or perfectly obvious, or of the kind that plaintiff and not defendant must
look out for, then, it [is] said, plaintiff will be held to have assumed them by voluntarily entering
into the relationship that entails them.
HARPERETAL., supra note 29, § 21.1, at 199-200. With primary assumption of risk "the defendant has a right to face
plaintiff with the dilemma of 'take it or leave it'-in other words, where defendant is under no duty to make the
conditions of their association any safer than they appear to be." Id. § 21.3, at 221.
39. See id § 21.1, at 200 (with primary assumption of risk defendant lacks a duty to protect plaintiff from a
risk, thus plaintiff may not recover for his injury even though he was quite reasonable in encountering the risk that
caused it).
40. Williamson, 83 N.M. at 340,491 P.2d at 1151 (quoting Meistrich, 155 A.2d at 93).
41. See id.
42. See id. Primary assumption of risk is another way of saying that the defendant is not negligent. It need
not be pleaded as an affirmative defense. See Meistrich, 155 A.2d at 93. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff who
must prove that his injury has been caused by a risk other than one inherent in the activity in which he voluntarily
engaged.See id.
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implied assumption of risk was subsumed by contributory negligence,4 3 thereby
abolishing the independent defense of assumption of risk" as unnecessarily
duplicative of other negligence doctrines.45 Shortly after being merged with
contributory negligence, secondary assumption of risk was completely eradicated as
a defense when New Mexico adopted comparative fault in Scott v. Rizzo.46
2. Consent
This subsection briefly summarizes the law of consent prior to Yount. Consent
occurs when a plaintiff "manifests a willingness that the defendant engage in conduct
' There need not be
and the defendant acts in response to such a manifestation."47
consent in fact to bar a claim in tort, nor need it be expressly communicated to the
actor.48 It may be inferred from words, silence, actions, or inactions, if reasonably
understood by another as consent. 49 Thus, while one will clearly be understood to
have consented if he pronounces, "It's all right with me," one will also be legally
consenting "if he holds up his arm without objection to be vaccinated., 50 Consent
may be assumed for normal contacts of every day life, or as a matter of custom,
absent expression to the contrary. Participation in sports manifests consent to
ordinary contacts and risks inherent in the game, even though a person has not in fact
expressly or explicitly consented.52 The plaintiff's consent in these circumstances is
not constructive consent, rather it is actual consent, implied from the act of

43. The New Mexico Supreme Court found that the distinction between secondary assumption of risk and
contributory negligence was illusory. See Williamson, 83 N.M. at 340, 491 P.2d at 1151.
44. The Williamson court did not say whether it was excluding from its analysis express assumption of risk
and situations in which actual consent exists, as in the case of contact sports. However, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals has interpreted Williamson as only merging implied assumption of risk concepts, while preserving actual
consent and express assumption of risk as a separate defense in some circumstances. See Thompson v. RuidosoSunland, Inc., 105 N.M. 487, 734 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1987) (discussing the different doctrines of secondary
assumption of risk, primary assumption of risk, consent as a defense which precludes recovery for sports injuries,
and express contracts not to sue).
45. See Williamson, 83 N.M. at 341,491 P.2d at 1152 ("[Alssumption of risk will no longer be a defense in
New Mexico. . . . If pleaded and warranted by the evidence, the ground formerly occupied by the doctrine of
assumption of risk will be covered by the law pertaining to negligence and contributory negligence.").
46. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); see supra note 3. The "all-or-nothing" doctrine of contributory
negligence was abolished as a defense in this seminal case. See Scott, 96 N.M. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239.
However, primary assumption of risk was preserved as a concept of negligence. See Diaz v. McMabon, 112 N.M.
788, 790 n.2, 819 P.2d 1346, 1348 n.2 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Williamson does not answer the question of whether
assumption of risk is still viable in New Mexico, as it relates to duty and breach of duty ....That case indicates that
assumption of risk, in its primary sense, is still the law."); see also Thompson v. Ruidoso-Sunland, Inc., 105 N.M.
487, 734 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1987); Moreno v. Marrs, 102 N.M. 373, 695 P.2d 1322 (Ct. App. 1984). Thus, where
primary assumption of risk exists, a plaintiff is summarily barred from recovery. See Scott, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d
1234; see also Thompson, 105 N.M. 487, 734 P.2d 267.
47. KEErONrTAL., supra note 6, § 18, at 113; see RESTATEMENT(SECOND) oFTORTS § 892(1), at 362 (1979)
("Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur.").
48. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 892, at 363.
49. See id. at 362-63.
50. KEETONETAL., supra note 6, § 18, at 113.
51. See id. §9,at42.
52. See Kabella v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461, 463, 672 P.2d 290, 292 (Ct. App. 1983); see also
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs, § 50 cmt. b (1965).
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voluntarily participating in the activity.53 However, for liability to be avoided by a
defendant, it is necessary that an injured participant's consent be effective.'
"Consent ordinarily bars recovery for intentional interference with [one's] person
or property," not as an affirmative defense, but as a negation of the wrongfulness of
the act." The basis for this is essentially the same as for assumption of the
risk-"volentinonfit injuria... no wrong is done to one who consents. '56 Rather
than expanding a defendant's duty, concepts of autonomy, personal choice, and
personal responsibility prevail, thus limiting a defendant's duty. Where a person
consents, whether apparently or expressly, to a given contact, the consent extends to
the ordinary consequences stemming from it.5" Therefore, while a claim for battery
would be actionable where the contact inflicted exceeded the consent apparently
given, a claim for damages for the unforeseen injuries resulting from any contact that
was consented to would be barred.59 Being so barred, a plaintiff also would be
prevented from recovering under theories of negligence'"and recklessness.
In Yount v. Johnson, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, in an exercise in
obfuscation, altered the doctrines of consent and primary assumption of risk as
traditionally applied. A statement of the case and the court's rationale follow.
Il.
A.

YOUNT v. JOHNSON

Statement of the Case
Mathew Monett and Larry Johnson61 were classmates in horticulture when, on

53. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2), at 362 (1965) ("If words or conduct are
reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as
consent in fact.").
54. See id. Section 892A(2) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides:

(2) To be effective, consent must be
(a) by one who has the capacity to consent or by a person empowered to consent for him, and
(b) to the particular conduct, or to substantially the same conduct.
See id.
55. KEETON ErAL., supra note 6,§ 18, at 112. This is similar to the effect of primary assumption of risk in
negligence law. See id.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 892A(l) cmt. a, at 364 (1965).
57. See KEErONErAL.,supra note 6, § 18, at 113. These doctrines emphasize "the individualistic tendency
of the common law, which... naturally regards the freedom of individual action as the keystone of the whole
structure." Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 14 (1906).
58. See HARFER ETAL., supra note 29, § 3.10, at 299.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 892A(1) cmt. a, at 367 (1965) (consent need only be to conduct
intended to invade plaintiff's interests, rather than to the invasion or the resulting harm). Consider the following
classic example:
In a friendly test of strength, A permits B to punch him in the chest as hard as he can. B does so.
Unknown to either A or B, A has a defective heart and as a result of the blow he drops dead. A's
consent is effective to bar recovery for his death.
Id. illus. 5.
60. See i "'By participating in the game, the plaintiff would have given his consent to the physical contact
permitted by the rules and usages of the game, and thus cannot recover under either the theories of negligence or
intentional tort."' See Yount v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 588, 593, 915 P.2d 341, 349 (Ct. App. 1996) (Hartz, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (M1l.1995) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 892A(1), at 364, § 50 cmt. b (1979))).
61. At the time of the incident Monett was fifteen years of age and Johnson was seventeen. See Yount, 121
N.M. at 588, 915 P.2d at 344.
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November 9, 1991, while engaging in horseplay, Johnson injured Monett.62 The
incident that injured Monett was preceded by some gentle horseplay between Monett,
Johnson, and a third student which included tagging each other on the arm, throwing
leaves at and turning sprinklers on one another, and running into and pushing each
other.63 Later that day, Monett came up behind Johnson who was talking to another
student, put both hands on Johnson's shoulders and proceeded to shake his friend.' 4
As Monett turned and walked away, Johnson lifted the boy from behind. With
Monett's legs under one arm and his head under the other, Johnson spun his
classmate around once or twice and then pushed him into a nearby fence. When
Monett complained that his back hurt, Johnson immediately put his friend down.
Monett who suffered from a pre-existing, asymptomatic back condition, sustained
serious injuries and sought to recover from Johnson for all or some of his damages.
At trial, Monett testified that he had participated in horseplay at school on several
occasions. He also indicated that there was an implicit rule that the manner of play
be matched with similar forms of retaliation.6' Thus, if horseplay were initiated with
punching, then the other participant was permitted to punch. Monett said that the
popular form of horseplay at the time of his injury was pushing one another around,
and that retaliation consisted of picking a participant up and throwing him in a nearby
ditch. Monett also testified that when the play became too rough, it was his practice
to request that the other participants stop the game.
Monett, through his mother, Kathryn Yount, sued Johnson under a theory of
comparative negligence. The district court granted summary judgment against Monett
concluding that Johnson could be sued only for recklessness or intentional and willful
misconduct. Monett appealed and the court of appeals reversed, holding that as a
matter of policy, persons engaged in horseplay owe each other a duty of ordinary
care.66 The court rejected consent and primary assumption of risk as a basis for
determining duty and reversed and remanded with instructions to conduct
proceedings to assess liability based on comparative negligence. 67
B.

Rationale

1. Majority Decision
The Yount court began its discussion with a reminder that public policy supports
a standard of ordinary care applied to both adults and minors. 68 "The movement has
been away from judicially declared immunity or protectionism ... 69 as evidenced
by the adoption of comparative negligence and the resulting abolition of outdated

62. See id.
at 586, 915 P.2d at342.
63. See id. at 595, 915 P.2d at 351 (Hartz, J., dissenting)
64. See id. Unless otherwise cited, all subsequent references to the facts of this case refer to Yount, 121 N.M.
at 586, 915 P.2d at 342.
65. See id.
66. See id.
at 591,915 P.2d at 347.
67. See id.
68. Minors, as adults, are held accountable for their actions, however, they "are afforded a more subjective
standard of care, one which takes into account their particular age, mental capacity, and experience." Id. at587, 915
P.2d at 343.
69. Id. at586, 915 P.2d at 342.
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doctrines such as contributory negligence (and its related secondary assumption of
risk),70 last clear chance, 71 sudden emergency, 72 and open and obvious danger.73 The
Yount court noted that it is more appropriately the role of the jury to decide questions
of negligence. As such, the defendant could properly be subjected to jury scrutiny
under a standard of ordinary care.
The defendant argued that precedent warranted that in the case of horseplay, a
plaintiff alleging only ordinary negligence must be denied recovery. The defendant
relied on Kabella v. Bouschelle,74 which held that in a cause of action for an injury
arising from participation in a sporting event, a plaintiff may only plead recklessness
or intentional tort. In Kabella, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed summary
judgment for the defendant who was a participant in an informal game of tackle
football when he hit the plaintiff with a particularly hard tackle and dislocated the
plaintiff's hip. The court found that participation in sports and recreation amounted
to consent to bodily contacts permitted by the rules or usages of the sport, however
informal.75 Although the court's affirmance was not predicated on consent alone,76
the court recognized that consent could bar recovery for intentional torts and for
normal risks inherent in the sport.'
The Yount court disagreed and distinguished Kabella, stating that the policy
considerations surrounding its holding in that case were lacking in the context of
horseplay, a game involving rough physical play with no specific parameters. 78 "The
rationale for limiting the duty in well-defined sports--to foster the appropriate fervor
in the players-is misplaced in situations where there are no rules or other controls
on the participants' behavior., 79 Any legitimate argument regarding a need to
exercise judicial protectionism to shield sports participants from lawsuits in order to
foster the longevity of formal and informal sports, loses its legitimacy when made in
the context of horseplay litigation.' "If we look to judicial protectionism from
accountability, we risk opening the door to special groups of all shapes and sizes, and
each can make a plausible case for its special need and the concomitant good to
society. Once formed, the line is endless."'" Hence, unlike the defendant in Kabella

70. See id at 586-87, 915 P.2d at 342-43 (citing Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682,684,687,634 P.2d 1234, 1236,
1239 (1981)).
71. See id. at 586-87, 915 P.2d at 342-43.
72. See id. (citing Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 359, 862 P.2d 1212, 1218 (1993)).
73. See id. at 586-87, 915 P.2d at 342-43 (citing Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 159, 824 P.2d
293, 299 (1992)).
74. 100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1983).
75. See id. at 463, 672 P.2d at 293.
76. The Kabella decision was essentially driven by policy considerations. "Fear of civil liability stemming
from negligent acts occurring in an athletic event could curtail the proper fervor with which the game should be played
and discourage individual participation ... " Id. at 465, 672 P.2d at 294 (quoting Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11
(Mo. 1982)).
77. See Kabella, 100 N.M. at 463, 672 P.2d at 292.
78. The preference for a standard of care exceeding negligent conduct arises from the perception that risk of
injury is a common and inherent aspect of informal sports activity, and depending on the nature of the sport, even
the negligent conduct of others may be an inherent risk assumed by participants. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696,
708 (Cal. 1992).
79. Yount v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 585, 590, 915 P.2d 341, 346 (Ct. App. 1996).
80. See id. at 591, 915 P.2d at 347.
81. Id.; see Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ohio 1990) (A standard of ordinary care for sports
participants would "open the floodgates to a myriad of lawsuits involving the backyard games of children.").
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who only could be held accountable under a standard of reckless or intentional and
willful misconduct, in Yount the injured plaintiff, Monett, could seek recovery from
the defendant, Johnson, on a negligence theory.
The Yount court ruled that as a matter of policy, primary implied assumption of
risk does not effectively bar recovery for alleged negligent horseplay. 2 Nor, opined
the court, will consent bar recovery because "[c]onsent is [only] a defense for
intentional torts like assault and battery."8" The dissent took issue with this reading
of the law of consent for reasons discussed below.
2. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Hartz in his dissent proposed affirmance of summary judgment, arguing that
no cause of action in negligence may be sustained where a plaintiff has consented to
the contact that injured him.8 In Judge Hartz's view, the plaintiff did in fact consent
to the physical contact that injured him. 5 Thus, in keeping with consent doctrine as
traditionally applied, the plaintiff should have been precluded from suing under
intentional tort, reckless misconduct, or negligence.8 6 Judge Hartz noted that by
holding otherwise, the majority drastically altered tort doctrine and implicitly rejected
concepts of individual responsibility which underlie the consent defense. 7
Judge Hartz further opined that the majority erred in rejecting consent as a defense
to a cause of action in negligence while simultaneously acknowledging that consent
bars actions in intentional tort. 8
It would ... be remarkable to recognize a cause of action for negligence when
a cause of action for an intentional tort is not available [because of consent].
Ordinarily, any distinctions between the right to recover for intentional torts and
the right to recover for negligent torts favor claims for intentional torts. 9
In explaining his position, Judge Hartz distinguished consent to an intentional tort
from assumption of risk of negligence. 90 "[A]ssumption of the risk 'is applied to acts
that are not intended to invade the plaintiff's interests but merely create a risk of the
invasion'" 9 -to wit, a spectator at a baseball game may assume the risk of being hit
by a foul ball, by virtue of being present, but he has not consented to being hit.92 On
the other hand, consent is to known or expected conduct, the physical invasion itself,
"such as consent to being tackled in football, tagged in baseball, or pinned in
wrestling."' When one consents to an act that is intended to invade his interest, one

82. See Yount, 121 N.M. at 591,915 P.2d at 347.
83. Id. at 590, 915 P.2d at 346.
84. See id. at 592, 915 P.2d at 348 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
85. See id. at 595, 915 P.2d at 350 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 592-93, 915 P.2d at 348-49 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 592, 915 P.2d at 348 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
88. See id. (Hartz, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 593, 915 P.2d at 349 (Hartz, J., dissenting) (comparing Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 214-15,
638 P.2d 423,426-27 (Ct. App. 1981), with Flores v. Baca, 117 N.M. 306, 310, 871 P.2d 962, 966 (1994)).
90. See Yount, 121 N.M. at 592, 915 P.2d at 348 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(A) cmt. A (1977)) (Hartz, J., dissenting).
92. See id. (Hartz, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Hartz, J., dissenting).
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necessarily relieves the defendant of liability for any risks inherent in that act so long
as it is carried out in the ordinary manner."
Rejection of consent as a defense to negligence, according to the dissent, was not
only contrary to law, it was also contrary to ideas of autonomy and fairness. 9 In
Judge Hartz's view, defendants should not be punished for reasonably relying on the
consent of another; nor should the ability of individuals to determine their destiny be
unnecessarily hampered by the courts.' Even "[i]n the context of play, no jurisdiction
has held that a participant is subject to a claim for negligence based on conduct that
complied with the rules."'
The dissent posited an explanation for the majority's mind "boggling" revision of
the law of consent.9" By virtue of the fact that many cases involving sports injuries
are resolved on the issue of duty defined by policy, the majority was misled in its
analysis in the view of Judge Hartz. 99 According to the dissent, the majority must
have erroneously asked the question of whether public policy favors horseplay,
answered it in the negative, and then consequently reasoned that the rationale which
supported lowering the standard of care in Kabella was lacking in the case of
"socially undesirable" horseplay. I0° Instead, explained the dissent, the majority
should have looked at whether Monett had consented to the contact because where
there is consent, there is no need to inquire into issues of public policy to determine
the scope of duty' °l Consent, however unreasonable, negates duty. °2 Only after asking the preliminary question of consent and answering in the negative should a court
engage in policy debate--"[w]hen analyzing the requisites for liability in the absence
of consent to the physical contact, it is appropriate to look to policies other than those
supporting the defense of consent."103
In questioning whether a plaintiff did in fact consent, according to Judge Hartz,
it is not necessary in all cases to delve into his state of mind at the time of injury. 4
A person may be bound by actions that manifest willingness, and that are reasonably
taken as such, regardless of intent. 105 Judge Hartz noted that "[t]he law does not
recognize crossing one's fingers behind one's back."' ' Because the plaintiff, Monett,

94. See id.
(Hartz, J., dissenting).
95. See id. (Hartz, J.,
dissenting).
96. See id.
(Hartz, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 593 (Hartz, J.,
dissenting). The dissent explained that even though some jurisdictions are divided
on the standard of care owed, there is general consensus that when conduct is within the rules of the game, formal
or informal, consent precludes liability. See id.
(Hartz, J., dissenting); see also Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013,
1017 (IMl.1995) ("By participating in the game, the plaintiff would have given his consent to the physical contact
permitted by the rules and usages of the game, and thus cannot recover under either the theories of negligence or
intentional tort.").
98. See Yount, 121 N.M. at592, 915 P.2d at 348 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
99. See id.
at 593, 915 P.2d at 349 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
100. See id.
(Hartz, J., dissenting).
101. See id.at 594, 915 P.2d at 350 (Hartz, J.,dissenting). Judge Hartz also criticized the majority for
discussing assumption of risk. Because this is a concept of negligence, and the case could properly have been resolved
under theories of consent and intentional tort, the majority, according to Judge Hartz, need not have "critique[d] the
doctrine of assumption of the risk." Id.(Hartz, J., dissenting).
102. See id.
(Hartz, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Hartz, J., dissenting).
104. See id.
(Hartz, J., dissenting).
105. See id.
(Hartz, J., dissenting).
106. 1d. (Hartz, J., dissenting).
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knew of the risks involved in horseplay... and did not manifest any objection until
his back began to hurt, l"s the dissent would have held that, as a matter of law, Monett
1
consented to participate in the horseplay that caused his injury.
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
constitutes actionable negligence, the Yount majority
horseplay
that
In holding
general standard that recklessness is the threshold for
to
the
carved out an exception
° Horseplay, unlike informal, pickup games of
recreation."
liability in sports and
tackle football will not be per se immune from claims of negligence."' Moreover,
once made, a negligence claim will be actionable virtually always because primary
implied assumption of risk and consent are no longer viable tort doctrines in the
horseplay context. The Yount court did not specify whether its treatment of primary
implied assumption of risk is limited to the area of horseplay litigation. The following
subsections briefly analyze the possible ramifications of the Yount decision.
The New Negligence Standard
"Policy determines duty." 112 Making a policy determination that horseplay is
socially undesirable, for its lack of parameters and inherent dangerousness, the Yount
court deemed it unworthy of "special treatment."'1 3 In other words, because there was
no need to safeguard vigorous participation from being chilled, those involved in this
boisterous activity must take responsibility for failure to exercise reasonable care
rather than have their liability predicated on reckless disregard. If the Yount court had
deterrence in mind as a possible outcome of the holding, it is questionable whether
this will occur. Horseplay is so commonplace, especially among youth, that effective
deterrence will likely require more than a shift in the law. Deterrence of horseplay
would require a shift in social norms-for example, children's playgrounds would
need to be far more closely monitored, or, perhaps, school recesses would need to be
abolished altogether.
The decision not to carve out an automatic immunity for horseplay defendants is
a sound, albeit seemingly arbitrary, one. As Judge Hartz pointed out in his dissenting
opinion, the message that policy favors Kabella v. Bouschelle' 4-type sandlot tackle

A.

107. The plaintiff, Monett, "testified that school horseplay included: 'pushing each other around. The big thing
for that-around that time was to take somebody and throw them in the ditch.' He said that he had personally
participated in horseplay, including pushing and punching others." Id. at 595, 915 P.2d at 351 (Hartz, J., dissenting)
(quoting plaintiff).
108. Monett also testified that on other occasions when the play became too rough he would ask that it stop.
See id. (Hartz, J., dissenting). However, he did not ask the defendant, Johnson, to stop as Johnson picked him up, nor
did he ask Johnson to release him as Johnson was spinning him around. See id. (Hartz, J., dissenting). Monett only
asked Johnson to stop when it became too much, when his back started to hurt. See id. (Hartz, J., dissenting).
109. See id. (Hartz, J., dissenting).
110. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, § 21.5, at 238. "Voluntary participants in lawful games, sports, and
even roughhouse... assume the risk of injury at the hands of their fellow participants (and of course of 'hurting
themselves), so long as the game is played in good faith and without negligence." Id.
11. Compare Yount, 121 N.M. 585,915 P.2d 341, with Kabella v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461,672 P.2d 290
(Ct. App. 1983).
112. Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609,612, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (1995).
113. See Yount, 121 N.M. at 587, 915 P.2d at 343.
114. 100 N.M. 461,672 P.2d 290.
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football games, but disfavors horseplay of the type in Yount, is one that is open to
criticism. "Many reasonable people may find [sandlot football games played without
protective gear] ... foolish.""' In fact, many people would probably consider sandlot
tackle football to be a form of horseplay-for it is "rough or boisterous play.""' 6
When the majority refused to liken the horseplay in Yount to informal wrestling, it
blurred such line-drawing for the future. Whereas informal football is clearly
protected under Kabella, it is unclear how a court will treat, for instance, an informal
sparring match, without protective equipment and only informal rules regarding
points of contact. It is not apparently obvious whether this would be considered a
Kabella-type activity or Yount-like horseplay. One thing is certain, it is far easier to
establish a prima facie case of negligence than it is to establish a prima facie case of
recklessness or intentional tort. As a result, sports plaintiffs will want to analogize
their situation to Yount, whereas sports defendants will likely cling to Kabella.
B.

PrimaryImplied Assumption of Risk Effectively Abolished?
Yount v. Johnson not only represents a departure from the standard of care
traditionally applied in sports and recreation cases in New Mexico, it also exemplifies
a change in the law of negligence with regard to primary, implied assumption of risk.
The decision abrogates implied assumption of risk as a concept of negligence while
preserving express assumption of risk as a viable doctrine. 117 It is unclear whether the
Yount decision will be applied only in horseplay litigation or whether it will affect the
liability of others, such as employers and landowners." 8 It also is unclear how this
abolition will effect a court's analysis of comparative fault and the role of the judge
and jury in this analysis.
Whatever the scope of Yount's treatment of primary implied assumption of risk,
insofar as the doctrine has been abolished, the new law parallels that of a minority
of other jurisdictions which have eradicated all forms of assumption of risk." 9 In
these jurisdictions, it is the role of the jury to determine duty and breach of duty as
factors in comparative negligence analysis."2 Primary implied assumption of risk

115. Yount, 121 N.M. at 594, 915 P.2d at 350 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
116. See WEBsTER' NE COLLEGIATE DIIONARY 552 (1977), quoted in Yount, 121 N.M. at 589 n.2, 915
P.2d at 345 n.2.
117. See Yount, 121 N.M. at 591,915 P.2d at 347 ("[nthe absence of some kind of express agreement to the
contrary, implied consent is of little consequence to the definition of... duty.").
118. The court in dicta recognized that primary, implied assumption of risk is still viable in New Mexico, but
in the same breath it deemed it inconsequential to the definition of duty owed, at least between horseplay participants.
See id. at 590-91, 915 P.2d at 346-47.
119. See, e.g., Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc., 737 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Nev. 1987) (doctrine of implied
assumption of risk was subsumed by the adoption of comparative negligence and has no significant impact on
negligence analysis); see also Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1977) (same). The Mizushima court explained:
The defense of assumption of risk is not favored .... It continues to vex and confuse as a
masquerade for contributory negligence. Moreover, it focuses on a lack of duty in the defendant
rather than the more compelling issue of comparative breach of duty by the parties. In that regard,
the doctrine faces backward, emphasizing escape more than accountability and inertia more than
progress. In short, we are unable to ascertain any productive reason why any species of implied
assumption of risk should survive the beneficent purposes and effect of Nevada's comparative
negligence statute.
Mizushima, 737 P.2d at 1161.
120. See, e.g., Mizushima, 737 P.2d 1158 (the jury is instructed on issues of negligence including duty, breach,
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now serves only to reduce a defendant's comparative negligence while not altogether
barring recovery. 2 ' This application of the doctrine of comparative negligence is
inconsistent with the policy and reasoning behind primary implied assumption of risk
as adopted in Williamson v. Smith. 2 When the New Mexico Supreme Court merged
primary implied assumption of risk with concepts of duty, it intended that a plaintiff
bear the burden of proving that the risk which caused his injury was not an inherent
aspect of a voluntarily encountered activity.'2 3 This was a requisite condition to
proceeding with a claim of negligence, and the burden existed, irrespective of
whether plaintiff was reasonable in assuming the risk." By eradicating primary
implied assumption of risk as a bar to recovery, rather than answering a threshold
issue of duty as a matter of law, the Yount court created a presumption of negligence
for defendants in horseplay litigation.125
After Yount, defendants, whose opponents before Yount would have been
summarily barred from recovery if they had assumed the risk in the primary sense,
will be forced to defend suits in comparative negligence. Now, in cases of primary
implied assumption of risk, where a plaintiff was reasonable in assuming the risk, and
not otherwise comparatively negligent, a defendant will bear 100% of the cost of the
plaintiffs injury. Alternatively, a plaintiff who is unreasonable in primarily assuming
the risk will only recover in the amount that the defendant is negligent. Because New
Mexico follows pure comparative negligence," 6 such a plaintiff may maintain a cause
of action even if he is 99% negligent as compared to the defendant's 1% comparative
fault. This may happen despite the fact that under Williamson" the plaintiffs lawsuit
would have been summarily dismissed for primary implied assumption of risk.
Finally, although a defendant who is found to have no comparative negligence will
ultimately prevail, it will not be before accumulating significant legal expenses in
preparing his defense.
This new application of the law could foster excessive litigation as plaintiffs may
now file claims that previously would otherwise be non-recoverable. With a judiciary
that may no longer exercise discretion and summarily withdraw a "horseplay" case
from the jury, not only will defendants suffer, but taxpayers also may incur higher
costs as a result of an increased number of jury trials. If the breadth of this holding
is spread to other areas of tort litigation, these ramifications will be magnified.

causation, and damages); see also Blackburn, 348 So.2d at 291 ("Under [the] Florida jury instructions, the jury is
directed first to determine whether the defendant has been negligent, i.e., did he owe a duty to the plaintiff and, if so,
did he breach that duty?").
121. See Blackburn, 348 So.2d at 293.
122. 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971).
123. See id. at 340, 491 P.2d at 1151 (adopting Meistrich v. Casino Area Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93
(N.J. 1959)).
124. See id.
125. The court refers to the "evident breach of duty" under circumstances where horseplay is involved. See
Yount, 121 N.M. at 590, 915 P.2d at 346.
126. See Taylor v. Delgamo Transportation, Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 142, 667 P.2d 445, 449 (1983) (citing Scott
v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981)).
127. 83 N.M. 336,491 P.2d 1147.
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C. The New Doctrine of Consent
The defendant in Yount contended that "the doctrine of consent bars the claim for
injuries arising from simple negligence in any activity voluntarily entered into by
participants. ' s The court of appeals correctly characterized this as an overstatement
of the law, 129 but then proceeded to define the law in a grossly understated manner.
In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court stated that while "[c]onsent is a
defense for the intentional torts' 30 of assault and battery, it does not bar a suit in
negligence. The court discussed the sports injury cases, explaining that participation
in contact sports may imply a consent to no duty of ordinary care, but that consent is
not the determinative factor in a duty analysis.131 Parties may not themselves
determine duty, unless by express agreement, said the court. 32 "Duty is defined..
•by the courts, not because of consent, but because of policy considerations that
merit special consideration in the form of a special duty.' ' 3 3 However, had the
plaintiff sued in intentional tort, and had traditional tort analysis applied, he probably
would have been denied recovery, as a matter of law, because of his apparent
consent.
The plaintiff, arguably, did consent to the horseplay.' 34 He had engaged in
horseplay with the defendant earlier that day and had a reasonable opportunity to
avoid continuing the game. 35 Instead, he voluntarily and deliberately reinitiated the
game by coming up behind the defendant and shaking him. The plaintiff had
participated in horseplay on a number of occasions, and knew that retaliation was the
norm. In fact, he knew that the normal response to shoving was to pick up one's
opponent and throw him in a ditch. When the defendant lifted the plaintiff after being
shoved, the plaintiff did not ask to be put down. Neither did he request to be released
when the defendant began spinning him around. Instead of ending the horseplay as
he normally did when it became too rough, the plaintiff arguably consented to
participate without objection until his back began to hurt. Only then did he express
a withdrawal of consent. It appears that the defendant relied upon the plaintiff's
manifestations of consent. The defendant did not alter his behavior until the plaintiff
expressed a desire to be freed, at which time the defendant immediately released his
friend. Thus, under traditional consent analysis, the plaintiff's apparent consent likely
would have been considered legally effective.

128.

Yount, 121 N.M. at 590,915 P.2d at 346.

129. The Yount court dismissed the defendant's argument that the doctrine of secondary assumption of risk
which, before being merged into contributory negligence in Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. at 340, 491 P.2d at 1151,
provided for a complete defense where a plaintiff, aware of another's negligence, proceeded voluntarily to encounter
it, thereby implicitly consenting to the negligent breach of duty. See Yount, 121 N.M. at 590, 915 P.2d at 346.
130. Id (citing inter alia Hellriegel v. Tholl, 417 P.2d 362 (Wash. 1966) (teenager whose neck was broken in
horseplay was barred from suing due to his consent to the contact)).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id. (citing HARPER ET AL, supra note 29, § 21.3, at 220-26).
134. Cf.Yount, 121 N.M. at 594-95, 915 P.2d 350-51 (Hartz, J., dissenting) (an analysis of the facts concluding
that the plaintiff Monett had in fact consented).
135. Unless otherwise cited, all subsequent references to the facts of this case refer to Yount, 121 N.M. at 586,
915 P.2d at 342.
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By implicitly consenting to the activity, the plaintiff necessarily assumed the risk
of injury resulting from this activity.' 36 Under traditional tort law, the plaintiff would
have been barred from recovering under any principle, whether battery, recklessness,
or negligence, because he consented. 3 7 After Yount, consent bars only intentional
torts.,3 Thus, the plaintiff would be free to seek recovery under a theory of
negligence or recklessness, although he would be barred under intentional tort
because of his consent. Similarly, the plaintiff who willingly engages in a boxing
match, as a matter of law,' 39 would be considered to have consented to the defendant
striking him. In this scenario, the plaintiff, while barred from recovery under
intentional tort doctrine, may freely bring an actionable claim for negligent infliction
of any injuries received as a consequence of being hit. As Judge Hartz in his dissent
4°
noted, "[t]he consequences of this proposition boggle the mind.1t Following Yount,
the law of consent, "as a practical matter... [will provide] little protection against
liability."'

14 1

In rejecting the doctrines of consent and assumption of risk, the court of appeals
in Yount stated that "[tihe evident breach of duty is not expunged by a spurious
doctrine of waiver based only on legal consent' fiction, rather than on actual intention
of the parties.' 42 One wonders if the court of appeal's next move will be an attempt
to abolish apparent consent. For traditionally, where a plaintiff manifests consent,
even if it is not his intent to consent in fact, if a reasonable defendant relies on these
manifestations, the plaintiff is barred from recovery.
V. CONCLUSION
Because it is easier to establish a prima facie case of negligence than it is to prove
reckless misconduct, and because consent is still a defense to intentional torts,
horseplay plaintiffs have a greater opportunity for recovery than other injured sports
participants who must plead recklessness oi intentional tort after Yount. Conversely,
horseplay defendants now bear a heavier burden with the unavailability of primary
implied assumption of risk and consent in crafting a defense. Application of the
negligence standard may encourage programs which promote safer playgrounds and
neighborhood parks. However, it is unlikely that such a standard will deter horseplay
on a large scale, especially among minors. Horseplay is a part of childhood and it
frequently occurs in unorganized and unmonitored environments.
It is fundamental that to recover in a negligence action, a plaintiff must first
establish that the defendant owed him a duty to use reasonable care and that he
breached that duty. The determination of the existence of a duty involves query into
whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to protection against the defendant's
136. While consent relates to known or expected conduct and assumption of risk deals with assuming the risk
of the consequences that may result from a set of circumstances, it is important to note that where consent to conduct
is effective, a party need not also plead assumption of risk. If there is consent to conduct there necessarily must be
assumption of the risk inherent in that conduct. See, e.g., supra notes 40-41, 56, and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
138. See Yount, 121 N.M. at 591, 915 P.2d at 347.
139. See Kabella v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461,672 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1983).
140. Yount, 121 N.M. at 591, 915 P.2d at 347 (Hart, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 592, 915 P.2d at 348 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 549, 915 P.2d at 346 (citing HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, § 21.5. at 240-41).
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conduct. 43 While considerations of policy should be factored into a determination of
the existence and scope of duty,'" it is also important to take into account the
plaintiff's reasonable expectations of care owed him by the defendant. In Williamson
v. Smith, 45 the New Mexico Supreme Court advocated consideration of the risks
assumed by the plaintiff. Moreover, strong policies of autonomy and fairness require
consideration of consent and primary assumption of risk.
After Yount, New Mexico no longer subscribes to this normative analysis.
Engaging in horseplay with traditional tort doctrine, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals drastically and profoundly revised the law of consent. The consequences of
this decision could be extremely unsettling to tort jurisprudence in New Mexico as
it opened the door to lawsuits in negligence that are otherwise barred in intentional
tort. Additionally, because primary implied assumption of risk as a bar to recovery
has been abolished by Yount, at least in circumstances involving horseplay, once
made, a claim will be automatically subjected to jury scrutiny of comparative fault
absent an express contract to the contrary.
In this land of individualism, personal freedom, and autonomous choice, when one
makes a choice of action, another should be able to safely rely on it. It is both
inequitable and unsound to expand a defendant's duty at the expense of individual
responsibility as was done in Yount v. Johnson.
KIRTAN K. KHALSA

143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 281, at 4, cmt. a (1965). One of the essential elements for
bringing a cause of action for negligence is that the interest of another be invaded and that said interest be "protected,
not only against acts intended to invade it, but also against unintentional invasions." Id.
144. See Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 612, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (1995).
145. 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971).

